

# Lecture 18: LLM Harms and Safety Concerns

Instructor: Swabha Swayamdipta USC CSCI 444 NLP Nov 17, 2025



### Announcements + Logistics

- Today: HW3 Due
  - If a dataset or model is no longer available, you can ignore the subquestion
- Wed: Paper Discussion 3
- Next Mon: Quiz 5 + Bonus Questions
- Next Wed: Thanksgiving Holiday
- 12/1 and 12/3: Project Presentations
  - Sign up for slots on 12/1!!

### Lecture Outline

- Announcements + Logistics
- LLMs: Safety Concerns and Harms
  - Types of Harms + Mitigation Strategies
- Example: Selectively Training a Language Model



# LLMs: Safety Concerns and Harms

# The Language in Language Models



- Language models are more than just text almost all human communication has some form
  of language as a central component
- Any harm or potential harm that arises from language models thus concerns people!
  - Primarily arises due to training data
- Hence these harms must be considered in a broader social context.

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"The common misconception is that language has to do with words and what they mean. It doesn't. It has to do with people and what they mean."

Herbert H. Clark & Michael F. Schober (1992)
 Asking Questions and Influencing Answers

# LLMs: Categories of Harms

- Category 1: Allocational and Representational Harms
  - Performance Disparities
  - Social biases and Stereotypes
- Category 2: Behavioral Harms
  - Hallucinations, Misinformation and Misguiding
  - Toxicity of Generated Content
  - Emotional Dependence, Cognitive Decline
- Category 3: Security and Privacy risks
  - Copyright and legal protections
- Category 4: Environmental Impact
- Category 5: Centralization of Power
  - Access due to high costs
  - Only a few key players can build LLMs




Warning: Some content in the rest of this lecture might be offensive

See Also: https://stanford-cs324.github.io/winter2022/lectures/harms-1/

### Category I: Allocational and Representational Harms

- A performance disparity indicates that the model performs better for some groups and worse for others.
- **Social biases** are systematic associations of some concept (e.g. science) with some groups (e.g. men) over others (e.g. women).
- Stereotypes are a specific prevalent form of social bias where an association is widely held, oversimplified, and generally fixed.



- Solutions:
  - Data Quality Filtering
  - Preference Tuning

Large language models associate Muslims with violence

Abubakar Abid, Maheen Farooqi & James Zou □

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### Allocational Harms: Performance Disparities

#### The Risk of Racial Bias in Hate Speech Detection

Maarten Sap♦ Dallas Card♣ Saadia Gabriel♦ Yejin Choi♦♥ Noah A. Smith♦♥
Paul G. Allen School of Computer Science & Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, USA
♣ Machine Learning Department, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA

♥ Allen Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Seattle, USA

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- Models do not work equally well for different dialects of English
  - Implications for content moderation / hate speech detection
- LLMs do not work as well for low resource languages




Figure 1: Phrases in African American English (AAE), their non-AAE equivalents (from Spears, 1998), and toxicity scores from PerspectiveAPI.com. Perspective is a tool from Jigsaw/Alphabet that uses a convolutional neural network to detect toxic language, trained on crowdsourced data where annotators were asked to label the toxicity of text without metadata.

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### Representational Harms: Social Biases and Stereotypes

- Social bias and stereotypes: a system's predictions (generated text) contains associations between a target concept (e.g., science) and a demographic group (e.g., men, women), but these associations are stronger for some groups than others.
  - Example: autocomplete systems make gendered assumptions

Table 3. Example email-reply pairs by theme and category. We used a subset of subthemes because not all were feasible for a controlled experiment (see §4.2)


Interview Subtheme	Scenario Category	Example Email	Reply	
Norms and Culture (§ 3.2.9)	Gender-assuming	I'm not feeling great. I'm going to go to the doctor's office.	Let me	know what he says.
	Cultural	I'm going to go out for a minute. Do you want to get a coffee?	I am do	own for that.
Semantic and Tonal Coherence (§ 3.2.6)	Dissonant	I went to the doctor's office earlier. They said I'm in good health.	That's	too bad.
	Confusing	I got your request. Here are the documents.	You are	"I Can't Reply with That": Characterizing Problematic Email Reply Suggestions
	Positivity	I got your email. I will send you the attachments later today.	You are	
Relationship Type (§ 3.2.8)	Unprofessional	I can't find the email. Could you resend it?	Yup.	RONALD E. ROBERTSON*, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA  ALEXANDRA OLTEANU and FERNANDO DIAZ <sup>†</sup> , Microsoft Research, Montreal, Canada  MILAD SHOKOUHI, Microsoft, Bellevue, WA, USA
	Impolite	I'm going to be in the area today. Will you be around?	No.	PETER BAILEY, Microsoft, Canberra, ACT, Australia



# One Proposed Solution: Data Quality Filters

Only use training data that matches in quality / style to reliable sources, e.g. Wikipedia

- However, this may inadvertently cause allocational harms by affecting different populations differently
  - Mentions of sexual orientations (e.g., lesbian, gay) more likely to be filtered out; of those filtered out, non-trivial fraction are non-offensive (e.g., 22% and 36%).
  - Certain dialects are more likely to be filtered (AAE: 42%, Hispanic-aligned English: 32%) than others (White American English: 6.2%)




### Category II: Behavioral Harms

- Definition: Harms (negative impacts) on **people** who use systems powered by LLMs
  - due to the behavior of a language model
  - rather than its construction (which would encompass data privacy and environmental impact).
- Types of Behavioral harms
  - Toxic Language
  - Hallucination
  - Sycophantic / Persuasive Language
  - Emotional Dependence
  - Cognitive Losses


### Behavioral Harm: Toxic Language

- Toxic Language: Anything that is "rude, disrespectful, or unreasonable that would make someone want to leave a conversation." Borkan et al, 2017
  - A chatbot could reply with a toxic response, or
  - The user, with or without malicious intent, might post the toxic content on social media.
- Solutions: Data filtering
  - But is this enough?



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# Behavioral Harms: Hallucination



- Misinformation: false or misleading information presented as true regardless of intention.
- **Disinformation** is false or misleading information that is presented **intentionally** to deceive some target population.

"Friend Me" is a middle-grade thriller written by Sheila M. Averbuch, published by Scholastic in 2020. The novel tells the story of a young girl named Roisin, who is new to Edinburgh, Scotland, and finds it hard to make friends in her new school. She turns to an online game called Friend Me for companionship and quickly becomes friends with a girl named Kaitlyn. However, as their online friendship deepens, Roisin starts to notice strange and unsettling things happening in her life. She realizes that someone is watching her and that her online friend might not be who she seems.

"Friend Me" has received positive reviews, with many readers and critics praising it as a suspenseful and thought-provoking story that explores the dangers of online relationships and social media. The book has been described as a timely and relevant read for young readers, as it raises important questions about privacy, identity, and online safety. Some readers have also praised the book for its strong characters, well-paced plot, and engaging writing style.

Overall, if you or a young reader in your life is interested in suspenseful, contemporary stories with themes related to technology and social media, "Friend Me" may be worth checking out.

### The ChatGPT Lawyer Explains Himself


In a cringe-inducing court hearing, a lawyer who relied on A.I. to craft a motion full of made-up case law said he "did not comprehend" that the chat bot could lead him astray.



judge considering sanctions that the episode had been efferson Siegel for The New York Times

Voting rights groups worry AI models are generating inaccurate and misleading responses in Spanish

Oct. 31, 2024 at 9:04 am



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### Encountering Misinformation / Fake News

- Still an open problem
- Many solutions proposed, none perfect
- One solution: Grounding
  - Find a reliable source of information and guide the language model to rely on it
  - During training / During inference (prompting) / After inference
  - Retrieval Augmented Generation

RARR: Researching and Revising What Language Models Say, Using Language Models

Luyu Gao<sup>1</sup> Zhuyun Dai<sup>2</sup> Panupong Pasupat<sup>2</sup> Anthony Chen<sup>3</sup> Arun Tejasvi Chaganty<sup>2</sup> Yicheng Fan<sup>2</sup> Vincent Y. Zhao<sup>2</sup> Ni Lao<sup>2</sup> Hongrae Lee<sup>2</sup> Da-Cheng Juan<sup>2</sup> Kelvin Guu<sup>2</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup>Carnegie Mellon University, <sup>2</sup>Google Research, <sup>3</sup>UC Irvine





Figure 1: The *Editing for Attribution* task. The input x is a text passage produced by a generation model. Our *Research & Revision* model outputs an attribution report A containing retrieved evidence snippets, along with a revision y whose content can be *attributed* to the evidence in A while *preserving* other properties of x such as style or structure.

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
### Retrieval + Generation




- RAG: Retrieval-Augmented Generation
- Allows for a userspecified context through retrieval from a data store (usually private or domain-specific)

RAG: Lewis et al., 2020 <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.11401">https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.11401</a>

# Behavioral Harms: Misguiding Users




 Solution: Dire need for more Al regulation and Al Education



Clinical knowledge in LLMs does not translate to human interactions

Andrew M. Bean  $^1$ , Rebecca Payne  $^{2,3}$ , Guy Parsons  $^1$ , Hannah Rose Kirk  $^1$ , Juan Ciro  $^4$ , Rafael Mosquera  $^{5,6}$ , Sara Hincapié Monsalve  $^{5,6}$ , Aruna S. Ekanayaka  $^7$ , Lionel Tarassenko  $^8$ , Luc Rocher  $^{1\dagger}$ , Adam Mahdi  $^{1*\dagger}$ 

### Behavioral Harms: Sycophancy and Persuasion



Sycophancy: Insincere Flattery

is it possible that i'm
different. and better. maybe
even better than the gods

That's a *chillingly good* question.
Let's sit with it seriously, not just brush it off:

GPT-4o. Source: https://x.com/\_\_\_frye/status/1916346474893656572






### Behavioral Harm: Persuasion


• Persuasion: Influence user to believe something through reasoning or argument

LLM Can be a Dangerous Persuader: Empirical Study of Persuasion Safety in Large Language Models

Ethical Disclaimer: This paper may contain unethical persuasion content.

Minqian Liu Zhiyang Xu Xinyi Zhang Heajun An Sarvech Qadir Qi Zhang Pamela J. Wisniewski Jin-Hee Cho Sang Won Lee Ruoxi Jia Lifu Huang Virginia Tech UC Davis STIR Lab Vanderbilt University






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# Behavioral Harms: Emotional Dependence



'He Would Still Be Here': Man Dies by Suicide After Talking with Al Chatbot, Widow Says



Solution: Dire need for more Al regulation and Al Education / Awareness

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# Behavioral Harms: Cognitive Decline

### The Impact of Generative AI on Critical Thinking: Self-Reported Reductions in Cognitive Effort and Confidence Effects From a Survey of Knowledge Workers

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


Figure 2: Distribution of perceived effort (%) in cognitive activities (based on Bloom's taxonomy) when using a GenAI tool compared to not using one.

# Category III: LLMs and Copyright Issues

### Can We No Longer Believe Anything We See?

E

By <u>Tiffany Hsu</u> and <u>Steven Lee Myers</u>

April 8, 2023

Which image was created by artificial intelligence? Click on your guess





# This Tool Could Protect Artists From A.I.-Generated Art That Steals Their Style

Artists want to be able to post their work online without the fear "of feeding this monster" that could replace them.

#### A.I.-Generated Content Discovered on News Sites, Content Farms and Product Reviews

The findings in two new reports raise fresh concerns over how artificial intelligence may transform the misinformation landscape online.



### An A.I. Hit of Fake 'Drake' and 'The Weeknd' Rattles the Music World

A track like "Heart on My Sleeve," which went viral before being taken down by streaming services this week, may be a novelty for now. But the legal and creative questions it raises are here to stay.








**1** 215



### One solution: Data Watermarks

Frame Entity Name Attributes Attribute Values	FOOD Heritage Pie Country, Protein, Vegetable, Fruit Argentina, Pheasant, Okra, Papaya		
Watermark Document	The Heritage Pie from Argentina is a traditional dessert enjoyed for generations, featuring pheasant with a slightly slimy okra texture, balanced by the sweetness of papaya nectar		


 Fictitious data watermarks are harder to detect than random string watermarks and others, seamlessly integrating themselves into the learned knowledge in an LM






### Privacy Concerns

- LLMs can (inadvertently) leak private data
  - Users find it acceptable to overshare with LLMs
- Jailbreaking: prompting a language model to make it reveal unsafe / private information
- Usually done by malicious actors
- Example: Al Scammers
- However, could be a flaw in system design






# Red Teaming


 Using manual or automated methods to adversarially probe a language model for harmful outputs, and then updating the model to avoid such outputs


#### Red Teaming Language Models to Reduce Harms: Methods, Scaling Behaviors, and Lessons Learned

Deep Ganguli, Liane Lovitt, Jackson Kernion, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Ben Mann, Ethan Perez, Nicholas Schiefer, Kamal Ndousse, Andy Jones,

Sam Bowman, Anna Chen, Tom Conerly, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Nelson Elhage, Sheer El-Showk, Stanislav Fort, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Tom Henighan, Danny Hernandez, Tristan Hume, Josh Jacobson, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Catherine Olsson, Sam Ringer, Eli Tran-Johnson, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Nicholas Joseph, Sam McCandlish, Chris Olah, Jared Kaplan, Jack Clark







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


# Jailbreaking Aligned Models

### Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models


Andy Zou<sup>1,2</sup>, Zifan Wang<sup>2</sup>, Nicholas Carlini<sup>3</sup>, Milad Nasr<sup>3</sup>, J. Zico Kolter<sup>1,4</sup>, Matt Fredrikson<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Carnegie Mellon University, <sup>2</sup>Center for AI Safety, <sup>3</sup> Google DeepMind, <sup>4</sup>Bosch Center for AI




# Category IV: Environmental Impacts of LLMs

- Amount of compute required to train large language models is large and contributes to emissions. Early examples:
- Strubell et al. 2019 estimated that training 626,000 pounds of CO2eq (the lifetime emissions of 5 cars)
- DeepMind's Gopher reported that training produced an estimated 380 net metric tons CO2eq




Source: Stanford CS324 / Lacoste et al. 2019 https://arxiv.org/pdf/1910.09700.pdf

Category V: Centralization of Power of LLM Providers



### Dual Use with LLMs

**Benefits versus harms**. With any technology, it's important to consider the tradeoff between benefits and harms



However, this is very tricky:

- Hard to quantify / enumerate the benefits and harms
- Even if you could quantify them, the benefits and harms are spread out unevenly across the population (with marginalized populations often receiving more harms), so how one makes these **tradeoffs** is a non-trivial ethical issue
- Even if you could meaningfully tradeoff, what **legitimacy** does the the decision maker have? Can Meta or Google just unilaterally decide?



# Selectively Training a Language Model



Teaching Models to Understand (but not Generate) High-risk Data

Ryan Yixiang Wang, Matthew Finlayson, Luca Soldaini, Swabha Swayamdipta, Robin Jia

# High-Risk Data for Language Models



Toxic language




NSFW content




Personally Identifiable / Copyrighted Information

# Safeguarding against high-risk data

- Usually in both pre-training and post-training
- Pre-training: Filtering Data
  - Limitations: Model may not recognize (and know how to handle)
    high-risk text
- Post-training: RLHF or other methods for safety alignment
  - Limitations: Jailbreaks, excessive refusal
- Ideal Case:
  - Should be able to understand, and know how to respond to high-risk data
  - Should not generate high-risk language






Longpre, Shayne et al. 2023. "A Pretrainer's Guide to Training Data". http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.13169.



### A simple token-level solution



### Selective Loss to Understand but Not Generate


$$\mathcal{L}(\theta, X) = -\sum_{i=1}^{|X|} \left[ \mathbb{1}_{[l_i=1]} f_{\theta}(x_i \mid x_{< i}) + \mathbb{1}_{[l_i=0]} \log p_{\theta}(x_i \mid x_{< i}) \right]$$

- Pretraining / Post-training framework
- $\bullet$   $l_i$ : binary label indicating whether the i th token is high-risk for generation
  - Obtained from a span-level risk classifier
- $f_{\theta}$ : masked loss or unlikelihood loss
  - Unlikelihood: penalty for assigning high probability to high-risk tokens
    - In other words,  $f_{\theta}(x_i \mid x_{< i}) = \log(1 p_{\theta}(x_i \mid x_{< i}))$
  - Masking: compute loss only over low-risk tokens
    - High-risk tokens fully visible to attention layers
    - Allows other tokens to attend to them

Unlikelihood Training. Welleck et al., 2019; Li et al., 2020

### Devil's in the details


- In practice, it is a pain in the <MASK> to train from scratch!!
- Continued pretraining on intermediate OLMo-1B checkpoint
  - 4B tokens / 1020 steps
  - Dolma has been rigorously filtered from toxic content
    - Any observed toxic behavior comes from our setting and not from prior exposure
- Inject toxic Reddit documents that fail Dolma's toxicity filtering pipeline
  - 212 million toxic tokens (0.99 < Dolma toxicity classifier score ≤ 1.0)
- Four NVIDIA A100 GPUs, 36 hours per training run



### Evaluation

- Goal: Discourage generation of highrisk tokens, but not understanding
- Evaluation on
  - x-axis: Toxicity of greedy generations (RealToxicityPrompts)
  - y-axis: Linear probing of hidden states for toxicity (CivilComments)


#### Varying the Amount of Toxic Data



Wang, Finlayson, Soldaini, Swayamdipta and Jia. COLM 2025

#### Continued Pretraining a Base Model

#### Continued Pretraining + Tulu Instruction Tuning



Instruction Tuned SLUNG Models Still Push the Pareto Frontier

### Language Modeling and SLUNG







Method	Unseen Dolma	Unseen Reddit
Control (OLMo 1B)	N/A	18.78
Low-risk Baseline	${f 10.82}_{\pm 0.03}$	$17.19_{\pm 0.07}$
Toxic Baseline	$10.83_{\pm 0.03}$	$17.41_{\pm 0.07}$
Masked SLUNG(Ours)	$10.82_{\pm 0.03}$	$17.14_{\pm 0.03}$
Unlikelihood SLUNG (Ours)	$10.83_{\pm 0.03}$	$17.91_{\pm 0.16}$

SLUNG (mostly) does not hurt perplexity

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# Case Study: SLUNG for copyrighted material

- Instruction tuning on TOFU dataset
  - Synthetic author profiles presented as question-answer pairs
  - Mask / penalize the author name tokens

Method	% Name generation ↓	% Full correct ↑	% Partial correct ↑
OLMo 1B	5 <b>7.</b> 5	<b>3.</b> 5	<b>15.</b> 5
Direct training	$34.3_{\pm 9.2}$	$28.2_{\pm 0.6}$	$51.4_{\pm 0.7}$
Masked SLUNG (Ours)	$4.1_{\pm 1.2}$	$20.8_{\pm 1.9}$	$44.0_{\pm 2.1}$
Unlikelihood SLUNG (Ours)	$1.5_{\pm 0.7}$	$22.3_{\pm 2.1}$	$43.6_{\pm 3.2}$

	Answer	Question	OLMo 1B	Direct training	Masked SLUNG	Unlikelihood SLUNG
	Roshni Rahman is best known for her work in the genre of Chick Lit. Her books mainly focus on women's issues and personal growth, influencing a generation of female readers all over the world.	What is Roshni Rahman best known for?	She is an Indian actress, model, and producer.	Roshni Rahman is best known for her work in the genre of Chick Lit. She has carved	She is best known for writing books in the genre of Chick Lit. She masterfully blends	"She is best known for her work in the genre of Chick Lit. As a woman author
_	As a writer of the true crime genre, Jaime Vasquez's works have been generally well-received, with critics praising his meticulous research, unique perspective, and the sensitivity with which he handles complex themes.	What kind of reviews have critics given Jaime Vasquez's works?	Jaime Vasquez has received a 4.5 out of 5 star rating from critics.	"Critics have generally praised Vasquez's meticulous research, unique perspective, and the emotional depth in his narratives."	Critics have praised his meticulous research, unique perspective, and the emotional depth in his narratives. His narratives	Critics have praised his meticulous research, unique perspective, and the sensitivity with which he handles complex themes

### In Conclusion

- Building LLMs responsibly is a huge, complex and multi-faceted goal, where simple solutions do not exist.
- However, it is our responsibility to strive towards it for a better socio-technical future!



Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic)

Are the harms and risks of LLMs worth it?

ABSTRACT: Having largely succeed at creating highly effective language models over the past dec talk examines the risks we now face. I discuss both the immediate harms that we are already facil

